“AI should be in your battle rhythm every single day. It should be your teammate. By mastering this tool, we will outpace our adversaries. The power is now in your hands.” Pete Hegseth, Secretary of War, 09DEC25
[Editor’s Note: SecWar Hegseth’s directive (above) was a clarion call for all Services to inculcate Artificial Intelligence (AI) into everything they do to ensure the Department’s mission — “provide the military forces needed to deter war and ensure our Nation’s security.” In today’s Army, AI complements our Warfighters in accomplishing their missions. The power of agentic AI, however, will both revolutionize and transform how our Army fights over the next 5-10 years. This AI-driven revolution will require an Officer Corps that is both technologically savvy and adept at harnessing and innovating with this transformative capability across all echelons and Warfighting Functions. As mechanization transformed the Army in the 1930s, this AI revolution will also require a cultural shift in how we grow and prepare future Army Leaders.
Today’s guest submission by returning blogger Dr. Jacob Barton is the first in a series exploring why the U.S. Army’s legacy Officer Corps’ career paths, promotion system, assignment models, Professional Military Education (PME), 
and functional areas “risk undermining the Army’s asymmetric advantage in leadership and adaptability” — especially given the realities of a rapidly evolving Operational Environment (OE). In today’s post, Dr. Barton addresses the challenges associated with our contemporary system generating the Army’s Leaders — future posts in this series will propose a prescription to address these challenges, outlining the Basic Skill Set requirements for our Officer Corps in the years 2030 through 2045, the associated systemic institutional changes required to sustain our asymmetric advantage in Leadership, and posit three future LinkedIn profiles of successful Generation Z Army Leaders in the mid-2040’s — Enjoy!]
Our pacing challenge, the People’s Republic of China, is integrating artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, and cognitive warfare into its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) at scale. To maintain overmatch, the U.S. Army must reimagine its officer corps—not as a collection of branches and functional areas, but as a dynamic, tech- savvy, strategically agile force. It must cultivate officers who are as fluent in data and influence as they are in Maneuver and Fires. As Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang cautioned, “You’re not going to lose your job to an AI, but you’re going to lose your job to someone who uses AI.” That warning rings true across every echelon of the Army. This means breaking down legacy silos, embracing flexible career paths, and empowering senior leaders to shape talent with precision. The Army of 2040 will be won not by mass, but by minds prepared to lead in complexity. We must act now — From Vision to Victory!
Operational Environment (OE) Trends:
1. Adversaries are integrating operations across land, air, sea, cyber, and space, and information to achieve strategic effects without direct 
conflict. Officer development remains largely domain-specific, with limited cross-training or Joint exposure early in careers. Only 12% of Army officers report receiving meaningful Joint or cross-domain exposure before field-grade ranks.1 This hampers the Army’s ability to produce leaders who can operate seamlessly across domains.
2. Technological advances in AI, autonomous systems, high-performance computing, and synthetic biology are changing the character of warfare. China’s AI investment alone exceeds $150 
billion.2 Career pathways and Professional Military Education (PME) do not consistently expose officers to emerging technologies or interdisciplinary thinking. Less than 20% of Army PME curricula include structured exposure to AI or data science. Technical fluency is undervalued in promotion and assignment systems — only 8% of promotion board members have Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematic (STEM) or technical backgrounds.
3. Adversaries are increasingly employing aspects of cognitive warfare, manipulating information, creating deepfakes, and employing cyber-enabled influence operations to shape perceptions 
and destabilize societies. Russia’s 2024 disinformation campaign used AI-generated deepfakes to target U.S. elections. Strategic communication, Influence Operations (IO), and Public Affairs Officer (PAO) roles are often seen as peripheral — only 3% of Army officers specialize in IO, PAO, or strategic communication roles.3 Officers with expertise in IO are not systematically developed or elevated to key decision-making roles.
4. Increasing availability of mass and precision strike at lower echelons and the effort to create near ubiquitous sensing (i.e., the transparent battlefield) are likely to push command, control, and sustainment nodes into distributed, vulnerable configurations. Over 70% of Army planning models still rely on centralized sustainment and 
traditional C2 structures.4 Officer education and planning models still train centralized logistics and traditional C2 structures, limiting adaptability in future contested environments — even as China’s PLA plans to wage “systems destruction warfare” to disrupt our ability to understand and perceive the battlespace, induce paralysis, neutralize our ability to function, and negate our ability to project power, wage war, and sustain our forces.
5. Adversaries are investing in human performance enhancement and artificial intelligence to improve leader development, PME, and 
cognitive abilities to outpace U.S. decision cycles. The PLA is investing in neuro- enhancement and AI-enabled soldier enhancement tools. The Army’s promotion and assignment systems often prioritize time-in-grade and command experience over cognitive adaptability, strategic foresight, and technological fluency.
6. The Army’s historical advantage—its leadership and adaptability—is being challenged by our adversaries’ evolving modernization efforts 
across doctrine, training, and personnel systems. Without reforms in talent management, PME, and career flexibility, the Army risks losing its asymmetric advantage in leadership.
The U.S. Army’s Challenge:
Officer Corps’ career paths, promotion system, assignment models, PME, and functional areas are not geared to sustain the advantage in human capital we’ve enjoyed for the past eight decades, especially given the rapidly evolving OE described above.
1. Rigid officer career structures limit cross-domain fluency and stifle innovation. The Army’s career architecture often locks officers into narrowly defined branch or functional area tracks, creating stovepipes that inhibit cross-domain agility. Approximately 85% of officers remain within their branch or functional area for their first ten years of service.5, 6 Officers who seek assignments outside their designated specialty—such as maneuver leaders pursuing strategy or cyber roles—frequently encounter institutional resistance or risk being “off-track” for promotion. 
Many officers are interested in pursuing more dynamic or unconventional assignments, but hesitate to do so because they are consistently told—and have come to believe—that such choices will jeopardize their career progression. This discourages exploration of emerging and evolving mission sets and limits the Army’s ability to cultivate leaders who can operate across operational, technical, and strategic dynamics. In an era of multidomain operations and hybrid threats, the Army should embrace flexible career architectures that reward cross-functional fluency rather than penalize it.
2. Promotion systems often undervalue technical expertise, data literacy, and strategic influence roles. Despite growing recognition of the importance of technical acumen and strategic communication, promotion boards continue to favor traditional command-centric profiles. Some officers serving in roles such as Operations Research/Systems Analyst (ORSA), PAO, cyber, or AI may struggle to 
compete with peers who follow conventional command and staff pathways. Officers in these technical roles are 40% less likely to be promoted to O-6 compared to their maneuver counterparts.7 This misalignment between promotion criteria and future force requirements risks limiting the potential of officers with critical skills in data analytics, IO, and emerging technologies. Without reform, the Army may fail to retain and elevate the very leaders needed to navigate the complexities of the evolving OE.
3. Marketplace-style assignment models (e.g., Army Talent Management Process [ATMP]) may dilute senior leader influence and strategic talent placement. The ATMP introduced transparency and choice into officer assignments, but it also diminished the ability of senior leaders to shape talent distribution strategically by approximately 60%.8 While ATMP empowers officers and units to preference each 
other, it unintentionally prioritizes popularity over mission alignment. Senior leaders—who possess the institutional vision to place the right officers in the right jobs at the right times—now face greater constraints in steering talent toward critical billets. This erosion of strategic stewardship risks misaligning high-potential officers with key developmental roles, undermining the long-term evolution and readiness of the Officer Corps.
4. Functional areas remain siloed, despite overlapping competencies and evolving mission sets. Many functional areas (FAs) were created to manage specialized skills; but over time, their boundaries have become barriers to integration. For example, acquisition officers (FA51), strategists (FA59), and cyber officers (FA17) often operate in overlapping areas but are managed separately, with limited interoperability or shared development or career pathways. Only 5% of officers transition between 
FAs during their careers.9 This siloed approach hinders the Army from building cohesive teams that blend operational experience with technical and strategic acumen. As mission sets evolve—especially in areas like AI, cognitive operations, and systems warfare—the Army should consider collapsing or reclassifying FAs into modular competencies accessible across branches.
5. Limited exposure to emerging technologies and interdisciplinary thinking in PME and broadening assignments. PME remains focused on traditional warfighting functions, with limited integration of emerging technologies such as AI, autonomous systems, and synthetic biology. Less than 25% of PME programs include modules on AI, autonomous 
systems, or synthetic biology.10 Officers rarely receive structured exposure to interdisciplinary thinking that blends strategy, data science, and systems design. Broadening assignments—while valuable—often lack deliberate alignment with future force competencies. Without changes that embed tech fluency and cross-domain integration, the Army risks developing leaders who are tactically proficient but strategically underprepared for the complexity of the evolving OE.
These issues risk undermining the Army’s asymmetric advantage in leadership and adaptability.
In Part 2 of this insightful series, Dr. Barton prescribes a remedy for these shortfalls, outlining the Basic Skill Set requirements for our Officer Corps in the years 2030 through 2045, and the associated systemic institutional changes required to sustain our asymmetric advantage in Leadership.
If you enjoyed this post, check out the T2COM G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including:
Our T2COM OE Threat Assessment 1.0, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations
Our China Landing Zone, full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, T2COM OE Threat Assessment 1-1, How China Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations, T2COM OE Threat Assessment 1-1.1, How China Fights Against a U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team, 10 Things You Didn’t Know About the PLA, and BiteSize China weekly topics.
Our Russia Landing Zone, including T2COM OE Threat Assessment 1-2, How Russia Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations and the BiteSize Russia weekly topics. If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine in 2022 and 2023 and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P.
Our Iran Landing Zone, including the Iran Quick Reference Guide and the Iran Passive Defense Manual (both require a CAC to access).
Our North Korea Landing Zone, including Resources for Studying North Korea, Instruments of Chinese Military Influence in North Korea, and Instruments of Russian Military Influence in North Korea.
Our Irregular Threats Landing Zone, including TC 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces, and ATP 3-37.2, Antiterrorism (requires a CAC to access).
Our Running Estimates SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access) — documenting what we’re learning about the evolving OE (including Russia’s war in Ukraine war since 2024 and other ongoing competitions and conflicts around the globe). Contains our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the quarterly OE Assessment Intelligence Posts.
… previous Mad Scientist Laboratory content addressing our need for rapid and constant innovation:
“Once More unto The Breach Dear Friends”: From English Longbows to Azerbaijani Drones, Army Modernization STILL Means More than Materiel by Ian Sullivan
China’s PLA Modernization through the DOTMLPF-P Lens and How will the RUS-UKR Conflict Impact Russia’s Military Modernization? by Dr. Jacob Barton
Other People’s Wars: The US Military and the Challenge of Learning from Foreign Conflicts and associated podcast, with Brent L. Sterling
Are We Ready for the Post-digital Hyper-war? by Capt Martin Crilly, British Army
Delta-V, by Chris Elles
Innovation at the Edge and associated podcast, with senior military leaders, field and company grade officers, and young Soldier/Innovators from the 3rd Infantry Division, 101st Airborne Division, and 18th Airborne Corps
Keeping the Razor’s Edge: 4th PSYOP Group’s Innovation and Evolution Council, by the 4th Psychological Operations Group (4th POG) Innovation and Evolution Council
The Future of Ground Warfare and associated podcast, with Proclaimed Mad Scientist COL Scott Shaw
The Case for Restructuring the Department of Defense to Fight in the 21st Century, by LTC Christopher J. Heatherly
Strategic Latency Unleashed! and Going on the Offensive in the Fight for the Future
Mission Engineering and Prototype Warfare: Operationalizing Technology Faster to Stay Ahead of the Threat by The Strategic Cohort at the U.S. Army Tank Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center (TARDEC).
… and posts exploring the transformative power of AI — spanning the gamut of potential applications:
Artificial Intelligence (AI) Trends
Takeaways Learned about the Future of the AI Battlefield
Artificial Intelligence: An Emerging Game-changer
Battle Tested: Revolutionizing Wargaming with AI and associated podcast, with proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. Billy Barry
Unlocking TRADOC’s Potential with GenAI: Opportunities and Challenges and Generative AI: The New Ammunition in the Data Arms Race and associated podcast, with Ben Van Roo
Artificial Intelligence: Shaping the Future of Biological-Chemical Warfare, by Jared Kite
Training Transformed: AI and the Future Soldier, by proclaimed Mad Scientist SGM Kyle J. Kramer
The AI Study Buddy at the Army War College (Part 1) and associated podcast, with LtCol Joe Buffamante, USMC
The AI Study Buddy at the Army War College (Part 2) and associated podcast, with Dr. Billy Barry, USAWC
Hybrid Intelligence: Sustaining Adversary Overmatch and associated podcast, with proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. Billy Barry and LTC Blair Wilcox
Rise of Artificial Intelligence: Implications to the Fielded Force, by John W. Mabes III
Integrating Artificial Intelligence into Military Operations, by Dr. James Mancillas
“Own the Night” and the associated Modern War Institute podcast, with proclaimed Mad Scientist Bob Work
Bringing AI to the Joint Force and associated podcast, with Jacqueline Tame, Alka Patel, and Dr. Jane Pinelis
Thoughts on AI and Ethics… from the Chaplain Corps
Gen Z is Likely to Build Trusting Relationships with AI, by COL Derek Baird
The Guy Behind the Guy: AI as the Indispensable Marshal, by Brady Moore and Chris Sauceda
AI Enhancing EI in War, by MAJ Vincent Dueñas
The Human Targeting Solution: An AI Story, by CW3 Jesse R. Crifasi
An Appropriate Level of Trust…
About the Author: Dr. Jacob Barton is a national security and defense technology executive bridging battlefield reality and strategic transformation. Operating at the nexus of government, industry, and defense innovation, his experience spans special operations, congressional defense policy, and large-scale modernization — driving advances in AI, autonomy, command and control, and decision advantage. He currently serves as the Director of Intelligence Delivery & Integration at T2COM G-2.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of War, Department of the Army, or the U.S. Army Transformation and Training Command (T2COM).
1 https://talent.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/DACES-Second-Annual-Report_FINAL.pdf
2 https://asiatechdaily.com/china-eyes-150-billion-ai-industry-by-2030-with-8-2-billion-investment-fund/
3 https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20071231_art013.pdf
4 https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1194370.pdf
5 https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/59905/Koh,%20Thomas.pdf?sequence=1
6 https://www.opa.mil/research-analysis/jamrs-recruiting-awareness/population-representation/2021-population- representation-appendix
7 https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA635630.pdf
8 https://ipps-a.army.mil/Drive-the-Change/Talent-Management/
9 https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/01/28/the-future-of-warfare-autonomous-technologies-in-modern-conflict/
10 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/automating-the-fight/what-does-the-future-of-autonomous-warfare- look-like-four-critical-questions-answered/
Fascinating direction of evolution Dr Barton has opened up here. There is an entire dimension of the problem/solution where China will maintain a significant edge, though.
In order to have the cognitive flexibility and capacity to sustain maximum innovation speed across rapidly recombinant domains, we are going to have to reach earlier and earlier into the formative education process. That is something a regime like China will likely adapt much faster, and each black swan that is hatched in developing their longitudinal training program will become a turbo boost making it harder and harder for us to close the gap before their next and then their next. To give an historical analogy, it will be the cognitive learning version of Welsh longbowmen.
The author describes the need to develop new career pathways. I believe a combination of “stove-piped” and “new” career pathways would be best here; that way the Army can hedge its bets on what is best to fill future needs.
In my article “REEL Marines” for the Marine Corps Gazette (February 2026), I describe a process of producing redundant leadership positions by retaining officers that normally would be discharged for not being promoted. What’s important here is that the process also produces an abundance of officers suitable to lead combat formations who are without commands. This excess of officers could be trained/educated in the required technical and scientific fields. This way the Army will be better positioned to fulfill its future needs.
Unfortunately, the article is behind a “pay wall,” but it might be worth a read for those with access.