[Editor’s Note: Army Mad Scientist has a proud tradition of employing interns through the summer and academic year. Our interns author Mad Scientist Laboratory blog posts, support production of The Convergence podcasts, help facilitate Mad Scientist conferences and document key findings in final reports, serve as judges in scoring Mad Scientist contest submissions, and enter open- source Operational Environment (OE) insights — just to name a few key mission requirements they support.
Today’s guest post submission is by Wyatt Forney, one of our current Mad Scientist interns, who brings up what normally is discussed as a geopolitical issue: Chinese malign influence in small Pacific Islands. Usually seen as a strategic issue of geopolitics between the U.S. and China, Wyatt brings the situation down to the operational and tactical level, describing how China’s economic influence provides it pathways to hamper US sustainment and operations in the event of a large-scale Pacific conflict through the installation of dual-use technology and positional advantage — Read on!]
Before the first missiles had left craters in airstrips, Guam was finished. Cyberattacks crippled its communications as the island was rocked by the Chinese missile bombardment. This attack delayed America’s response to the beginning of the Joint Island Landing Campaign in Taiwan, but not for long. The second missiles fire, alarm bells go off across satellite networks, letting the United States know it is at war. Its response is a steady flow of bombers, fighter planes, and submarines, bound for airfields and forward arming points on islands across the Pacific. The supply lines trail behind, carrying the necessary fuel, munitions, and watercraft for each mission. The plan: this military machine will push all the way to the First Island Chain, ready to counter the PLA.
Except not all goes according to the plan. Commercial contractors transporting supplies through the ostensibly safe waters of Kiribati find their navigation systems unusable, scrambled by GPS jammers. Partner countries like Australia and New Zealand are threatened by undersea cable attacks and the same cyberwarfare that silenced Guam. In the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, the PLA has somehow established a presence closer to Hawaii than estimates ever predicted. Everywhere the Army turns, it seems China knows its moves before it makes them. This series of events upends operational strategy in the Pacific, leaving questions in the minds of everyone involved: How could China have stretched its influence so far across the ocean without us knowing? And what do we do now?
Debt Trap Diplomacy
Throughout the South Pacific, China has spent hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign investment projects between multiple Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Although much of this goes towards disaster relief and infrastructure development, other foreign investment projects include large government buildings, skyscrapers, and cultural monuments. China’s projects here are sometimes viewed through the lens of a struggle for geopolitical influence against the West or eastward expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative, but that characterization belies the true nature of China’s plans for the region. 
SIDS in the South Pacific have already amassed significant debts to China. Tonga, Samoa, and Vanuatu all count debt repayments to China as more than 1% of their GDP, with Tonga having the third-highest Chinese debt repayment-to-GDP ratio in the world. Sri Lanka and Djibouti provide prescient examples of what could be next. Excessive debts from Chinese foreign investment gave the countries little room to negotiate on the respective establishments of a port and a naval base, providing China with permanent economic and military footholds in each region. Vanuatu’s 360-meter, carrier-capable wharf in the Port of Luganville and rejuvenated WWII-era airstrips in Kiribati and Micronesia are similar “dual-use” projects that China could look to claim as collateral on foreign investment debts. Doing so would greatly improve the PLA’s position and capabilities in the Pacific, having major implications for large-scale combat operations (LSCO) in the region.
Surveillance States
China has already shown its plans for extending its infamous surveillance systems to the islands of the South Pacific, even before any military installations are put in place. In late 2025, when locals in the Solomon Islands reported nighttime disturbances to the imported Chinese police force, they were briefed on the implementation of the “Fengqiao Experience.” First utilized by the CCP to break the back of opposition parties in the province of the same name, this surveillance system requires civilians in a town or city to monitor their neighbors for signs of dissidence and report them. The police also keep detailed biometric records of citizens, including fingerprints and facial scans. Modern applications of the system also utilize powerful networks of cameras to allow for individual monitoring of large security “grids.” 
There is also extensive evidence that the governments of the SIDS are colluding with the PRC to limit media coverage of developments between them, both in politics and infrastructure. A Canadian journalist in Vanuatu had his work permit revoked after reporting on the China-facilitated arrest and deportation of several Chinese nationals from the island, with the Vanuatu government offering no explanation for why the sixteen-year press veteran’s status would be revoked. This heavy-handed journalistic suppression is becoming more common in the region, with media blackouts preventing coverage of visits by important Chinese figures and hindering the US’s ability to gather intelligence.
For some countries, China can simply piggyback off the existing constraints on the press and state control of the media to further its surveillance of outside influences. Most countries in the South Pacific already have low ratings for freedom of the press, according to multiple watchdog groups. In Kiribati, the government requires a sizable fee –$2,100 U.S. Dollars (USD) – to record and publish footage taken of the country. The consequences for filming without a permit range from an additional $7,000 USD fine to deportation; this is further complicated by a contract stipulation that allows the government to revoke the permit at any time. An news media film crew encountered these limitations firsthand while filming in the country. After being tailed down an island’s only street by a black SUV, they were placed under house arrest and told to return to Australia.
Not only will further information on dual-use developments in the Pacific be slow to travel outside of the islands, but the obvious collaboration between the governments of island nations and China means that American, allied, and partner military operations in the area could be tracked and reacted to. This represents a battlefield transparency advantage for the PLA that will be a crucial element of LSCO in the South Pacific.
Electronic Warfare
China’s strategy for sea supremacy revolves around denial, of which denying accurate geographic information can be a key piece. GPS spoofing in the region will play a large role in determining information dominance during LSCO in the South Pacific. China has already begun installing powerful spoofing technology in contested waters in the South China Sea, making its spread to other maritime economic hubs a dangerous possibility. Some SIDS have an outsized influence on global commerce due to their adjacency to sea lanes of trade, leaving them vulnerable to GPS tracking and spoofing. For example, the Kiribati Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is roughly the size of the contiguous United States and integral to international trade between the Americas and Asia. 
The Army also runs into a unique problem with Chinese GPS spoofing. Because the US relies heavily on commercial contractors when transporting materiel and maintaining supply lines during LSCO, the signal interference could be particularly effective against commercial navigation systems. This logistical vulnerability may hinder sustainment operations in the region unless addressed.
Another pressing electronic warfare capability of China’s is its recent investments into undersea cable-cutting capabilities and their potential installation on commercial, dual-use vehicles. After numerous incidents in which Chinese ships were believed to have purposefully dragged anchors over or otherwise damaged undersea high-speed internet cables, Chinese state media recently announced that a research vessel had successfully tested an underwater grinding wheel that could be used to completely sever such a cable.
Cable vulnerability poses a clear threat to international communications, as cables are easy targets for infrastructure attacks that could potentially isolate entire countries. The South Pacific has already been an accidental test environment for such a blackout. Following a volcanic eruption in 2022, the only undersea cable connecting Tonga to international networks was severed. For the next few weeks, the nation was completely isolated from the outside world as cable repairs took place alongside disaster relief.
China can now cripple countries with the same force as a natural disaster, and its new positions in the South Pacific could let it target not only US allies and partners but US military bases throughout the Pacific – many of which are still dependent on the cables – severing communications with the rest of the world through a combination of its cable-cutting technology and cyberattacks.
A well-recognized prediction of China’s strategy following a potential invasion of Taiwan or another island in the South China Sea is their implementation
of cyber warfare to delay and deny US support to the region. Cyberattacks on major US ports along the West Coast and in Hawaii would already pose great threats to national security, even before considering the additional power afforded to China by its newfound proximity to these target sites.
Although physical distance does not impact the strength of cyberattacks, the ability of PLA forces to use their position in the South Pacific SIDS for simultaneous or follow-up fires on US, allied, or partner military installations would heighten their efficacy. As seen in the Russo-Georgian War, cyberattacks set the stage for a swift victory over an unprepared government of a developing state. China’s cyber capabilities give them inroads to invasion across multiple states in the region.
The Future of Conflict in the Pacific
Small island states have been and continue to be of great importance to LSCO in the Pacific; the islands were key to sustainment in World War II, when their position made them an important throughline to a wartime partner in Australia. Australia is still key to maintaining LSCO in the Pacific, as its northern coast houses partnered military bases the US plans to use as a launchpad during conflicts in the region. PLA presence in the SIDS could create a positional advantage that disrupts access to these forward staging points, which the US Army would not be able to ignore.
Although small, the islands could have a large impact on how China can be expected to act during LSCO in the Pacific. The Army will be challenged to project power and maintain logistics across the ocean if projections do not adequately account for the impact that China’s presence in the South Pacific islands would have. Like Imperial Japan before it, China would be able to use its position here to prevent US and allied advances across the Pacific towards the first and second island chains while threatening strikes on New Zealand and Australia.
China’s actions in the South Pacific SIDS may seem strategically abstract, but their presence here could become more threatening through increased military presence, force capabilities, and electronic warfare. The safety of these islands should not be taken for granted when planning for conflict with China. This confrontation from China puts the Army at risk of losing its ability to project power and sustain operations across the Pacific, a key component of U.S. responses to a Chinese incursion on Taiwan and in the First Island Chain. What started as economic courtship and security assistance for the South Pacific islands could soon pose a generational challenge for the US Army.
If you enjoyed this post, check out the T2COM G-2’s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight.
About the Author: Wyatt Forney is an intern with the Army Mad Scientist team as a part of T2COM G-2. He is currently a third-year student at the University of Richmond studying Political Science and Linguistics, with a focus in Middle Eastern politics and Modern Standard Arabic (الفصحى). He looks to pursue a career in intelligence after graduation. He also enjoys being a radio DJ at the University of Richmond.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, or the Transformation and Training Command (T2COM).
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