[Editor’s Note: Today’s post welcomes back Mr. Jason Flores Rutledge with another insightful post! Mr. Rutledge discusses the cognitive load problem ground commanders face in the modern era of combat where the battlefield is not only the ground, but also the land-aerial littoral, consisting of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and electronic warfare at low altitudes. He argues that there are actually two battlefields in the same space, and that a new position, the Independent Support Coordinator, could help with dealing with the new land-aerial littoral, and therefore take some of the load off the commander. — Read on!]
Introduction
This blog post makes three intertwined points pertinent to the future battlefield as predicted by contemporary wars. First, it argues that future battles employing aerial littoral drones will be fought on two battlefields which occupy the same space simultaneously and which are closely connected. Second, the resulting cognitive loads will affect the American leader’s mind in a way that will lead decisively to defeat. Third, the article remedies the expectation by introducing the “Independent Support Coordinator” (ISC) position; the ISC would be primarily concerned with the counter-drone (counter-UAS) role and drone usage; however, support would also involve producing traditional supporting effects and attacks both in coordination with the combat leader and independently from him. It is imperative to realize that the appropriate understanding combined with the ISC solution will remedy the cognitive overload, defeat enemy drones, allow normal formation performance, permit successful drone employment and use of other support elements.
Point One: Two Battlefields in One
Any side’s use of aerial drones turns one battlefield into two battlefields which occupy the same space simultaneously and which are closely connected. For our purposes we define the word “battlefield” as comprising an environment and its boundaries.
Let’s imagine a simple battlefield. There is a sporadically dotted forest covering level ground further defined by imaginary boundaries. For the “conventional” battlefield founded on a “grounded” perspective, we can deduce that travel will be hindered by the forest while simultaneously reducing line-of-sight to short distances. Also, the distances involved will be intimidating since the area’s boundaries are far apart. 
The same terrain is very different for aerial drones. Aerial drones will be unimpeded since they can fly above treetop level. Though the forest will hinder detection of ground forces, the distances involved will likely be long since the drones are flying high above. Also, the distances involved will be considered short because aerial drones can fly over obstacles.
From here, it can be argued that the battlefield is in fact two battlefields: the traditional “ground” battlefield and the “Land-aerial littoral” battlefield. The “Land-aerial littoral” is low-altitude airspace immediately above the land where unmanned systems, sensors, fires, electronic warfare, counter-UAS, and ground maneuver forces converge to sense, strike, protect, and move. So, how does this fact affect the combat leader’s “cognitive load?”
Point Two: The Cognitive Load Problem
Discussed here is “cognitive load” as it affects the combat leader. “Cognitive load” is defined by the US Army as “mental demand placed on an individual or team to perform tasks, manage information, and make decisions under operational conditions.”
The problem is that the modern combat leader faces an unmanageable battlefield that can overwhelm his cognition. Not only must the leader employ traditional arms and tactics, but he must also use drones while defeating the enemy’s drones. These machines offer persistent surveillance and detection plus the ability to easily destroy all enemies. Failing to address drones correctly means dangerous inefficiencies, less information to act upon, unnecessary casualties, and battles lost. All of this would happen due to the immense cognitive load on the American combat leader’s mind.
Point Three: Defining the ISC Solution
The solution is to divide the cognitive load and authority to act to a new position: the “Independent Support Coordinator” (ISC) position. This position would work both in conjunction with the combat formation’s leader and independently of him to achieve his intentions; this would primarily involve controlling the “drone battle” overhead. The combat formation’s leader would give the ISC his intentions, assign tasks to be completed, and effects to be achieved.
The ISC would fulfill roles in conjunction with aerial drones. First, the ISC would be responsible for the counter-UAS role; success here would allow the formation freedom to maneuver. Additionally, the ISC would use drones to provide the combat leader battlefield awareness. And the ISC would also, at the least, eliminate key enemy assets by controlling UAS weapons like deadly precision munitions. The ISC would control UAS assets, and grounded counter-drone assets, to accomplish his mission to meet the commander’s assigned tasks, create desired effects while remaining within the leader’s intentions.
Accomplishing these things would have the ISC also call down effects and attacks from traditional supporting arms on behalf of the fighting formation. Examples would be artillery and working with aircraft; the ISC position would replace roles like the Forward Observer (FO) and Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC). In other words, the ISC position would serve as a liaison for the combat leader, and as an authority trusted to call down effects on his own initiative.
ISC Benefits
Numerous benefits result from delegating authority and responsibilities to the ISC position that would normally slow down combat leaders. First, the position reduces the education that combat leaders need by shifting some of that burden upon a new person. Second, allowing the ISC to work independently of the commander, but with his intentions in mind, would likely reduce the combat leader’s cognitive load back to manageable levels. For his part, the ISC would have a limited cognitive burden since he would lead only a small unit of drone operators while controlling effects. Finally, the slowdown in combat tempo by one person combing through countless options can be alleviated by maximizing the efficiency of actions taken over a given time through delegated authority. Sometimes, even the finest mind may not know everything necessary to conduct a modern battle; hence, a division of authority and responsibilities is required for success.
Supporting Evidence
Delegating authority and responsibilities to the ISC position would be consistent with Army customs. Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad details the division of authorities and responsibilities within the platoon. Among other things, the Platoon Leader “maneuvers squads and fighting elements” and “synchronizes the efforts of squads;” the Platoon Sergeant is responsible for “positions where best needed to help the engagement….” Likewise, the Forward Observer “calls for and adjusts indirect fires” and “selects targets to support the platoon’s mission.” Furthermore, warrant officers hold technical knowledge that commissioned officers do not; “warrant officers are technical experts that manage and maintain increasingly complex battlefield systems.” It would be warrant officers who would be appropriate for handling and maintaining drones.
The Army is no stranger to the necessity of delegating authority and responsibilities among multiple people; therefore, there could be ample support for the ISC position.
Battlefield Implementation
Gaining further support for the ISC position rests on showing how the position would act in combat.
Again, the commander would inform the ISC of his intentions, assign tasks to complete and effects to produce. A variety of techniques could be developed to facilitate the relationships between commanders and ISCs.
One potential technique is the “Requests Sphere and Support Annulus.” Imagine two circles on a map where one is found completely within the larger one; both would be centered on the combat leader’s position and would move with him. The inner circle represents the “Requests Sphere” where the combat leader would have control over supporting effects. The “Support Annulus” is the space between the two circles. (An “annulus” is the space between the two circles where one is entirely within the other.) Within the annulus is where the ISC would independently control supporting attacks and effects.
The “Requests Sphere” is the area where the combat leader must request effects; this prevents unwanted consequences from not coordinating with the ISC. Traditional examples like calling for bombardments or aerial attacks would be found within the Requests Sphere. 
Yet any support within the “Support Annulus” can be provided by the ISC on his own initiative. Since the combat leader is heavily engaged with his own responsibilities, the ISC would through his own will act to address threats to the formation and the commander’s intentions. For example, approaching drone swarms could be engaged by friendly assets at the ISC’s direction. Likewise, the ISC could request smoke bombardments to conceal friendly forces from newly arrived enemies. Finally, the ISC could use friendly drones to intercept approaching airborne foes.
The ISC role would consolidate many roles such as the Forward Observer (FO) for artillery, the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) for directing airstrikes, evolving positions involving drones, and traditional Air Defense roles. The ISC position is one of great power and importance, but who might be trusted with such responsibilities?
ISC Requirements
For the sake of argument, this article will present a theoretical career progression for the ISC position.
The ISC position is properly filled by warrant officers since they are the US Army’s technical experts. The ISC career would begin by having a warrant officer finish his training as a drone operator. Doing so will establish the foundational knowledge need to operate and maintain Unmanned Aerial Systems which would be utilized on the platoon and company level. He would be primarily responsible for handling UAS assets at the ISC’s direction.
The ISC position would be filled by higher-ranked warrant officers. His education would include how to act as a FO and JTAC plus he would lead lesser ranked warrant officers who use drones. This team would be responsible for supporting the platoon leader. Somewhere along the line, the ISC would learn conventional tactics so he can learn to read the battlefield and react/act accordingly. Naturally, higher-ranked warrant officers would form the teams appropriate to assist higher-level formations.
ISC Tradeoff
There is a tradeoff with using ISC soldiers regarding training times. The ISC soldier would be comprehensively trained in drones and all manners of supporting fires and effects; he would need more training before deployment. Obtaining one masterful ISC means forgoing at least three experts through traditional means when it comes to time: a drone operator, FO, and JTAC. However, remedies exist.
Leaders can hasten ISC training. The three lanes of drone operator, FO and JTAC training would remain. The three candidates would simply attend the three training regimens in different orders. For example, candidate A would attend drone training while candidate B attends FO training; then A would study FO training while B would learn about drones. Though the sequence of training would be different, eventually all three vocations would be learned by ISC candidates. However, it would be simpler to expand the number of training venues. And the ISC position is immensely important given a largely unknown problem with current Army practices.
An advantage to forgoing traditional experts and using ISC masters is that frontline formations are no longer detrimentally dependent on preplanned support. For example, only drones could support the drone operator’s intentions. Only artillery could fulfill the needs of a FO and mostly only aircraft could be employed by a JTAC. In the fluidity of future battles, it is easy to predict that planned support modes will be lost or otherwise unavailable; yet good fortune may allow a different category of support through an ISC soldier. ISC masters allow flexible responses to enemy action and options on the offensive.
Conclusion
In conclusion, because of aerial drones, the future battlefield could be two battlefields which occupy the same space simultaneously and which are closely connected, the “ground” battlefield and the “land-aerial littoral” battlefield. This fact will overwhelm the cognition of American combat leaders unless addressed innovatively.
The answer could be the Independent Support Coordinator (ISC) position. This position would work both in conjunction with the combat formation’s leader and independently of him to achieve his intentions; this would primarily involve controlling the “drone battle” overhead. Doing this will divide the cognitive overload represented by drone usage into manageable burdens. This would involve dividing up the education, technical expertise, and the battle’s cognitive load upon an additional set of proverbial shoulders. Additionally, the ISC would consolidate numerous positions into one and become responsible for requesting support from traditional assets like artillery and aircraft.
Success at war could rely on innovations like the Independent Support Coordinator position and it could be highly beneficial for the Army to consider a position of the sort.
If you enjoyed this post, check out the T2COM G-2’s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight.
About the Author: Jason Flores Rutledge is a civilian friend of the United States Army. He has unfortunately been disabled but seeks to contribute to society through his writings. He also hopes to eventually earn an honorary rank over time. Jason’s unusual achievements include high placements in wargames, both online and at hobby stores. Presently, he is working on more topics related to Multi-Domain Operations.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, or the Transformation and Training Command (T2COM).
Sources
Antal, John. Drone Dominance: Seizing War’s New High Ground. Havertown, Pennsylvania, Casemate Publishers, 01 Nov. 2026.
Johnson, Craig J. and Amar R. Marathe. “Cognitive Workload Considerations for Human–Machine Integrated Formations”;. Devcom Army Research Laboratory, Apr. 2025, https://arl.devcom.army.mil/wpcontent/uploads/sites/3/ARL-TN-1248.pdf. Accessed 13 Aug. 2026.
Department of the Army. (2024). Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad (ATP 3-21.8). https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/FM%20321.8%20%20The%20Infantry%20Rifle%20Platoon%20and%20Squad_1.pdf
“Warrant Officer Overview”;. Army University, 13 Aug. 2026, https://www.army.edu/USAWOCC/Warrant-Officer-Overview/. Accessed 13 Aug. 2026.
