[Editor’s Note: Army Mad Scientist welcomes back T2COM G2 analyst, Mr. Dorsel “Flip” Boyer as today’s guest blogger. In this insightful piece, Flip brings up Chinese military-civil fusion and how it contributes to their magazine depth of drones and other aerial technologies that can operate at low-altitudes and affect ground combat. This zone is known as the “air-ground littoral,” and he argues that China is building an advantage here through its procurement practices. He then brings in ways the U.S. and her allies could respond, and build out an indigenous “low-altitude economy” — Read on!]
China is leveraging advancements in unmanned systems technology, artificial intelligence, and edge computing to operationalize the “air-ground littoral“—the low-altitude airspace from the surface up to a few thousand feet where ground forces, low-flying drones, and electronic warfare intensely interact. Driven by the mandates in the 15th Five-Year Plan, this Low-Altitude Economy (LAE) is establishing an attritable, dual-use “Aerial Militia.” To defeat the implementation of the LAE into a future Joint Island Landing Campaign, the U.S. Joint Force should prepare to abandon platform-centric air defense in favor of network defeat. Simultaneously, the U.S. and its allies could maximize optionality for sustainment in large-scale combat operations by “reverse-engineering” a similar capability by leveraging democratic and free-market mechanism to build our own “Civil Reserve Drone Fleet”.
The Maritime Militia Analog: from Sea to Sky
We are deeply familiar with China’s Maritime Militia—state-subsidized commercial fishing fleets partnered with professional militia forces that act as a deniable, decentralized Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and harassment force in the South China Sea. Today, China is applying that exact Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) playbook to the skies.
Analysis of Chinese publications highlight the Chinese Communist Party’s development of the LAE as both a civilian commercial enterprise and a development driven by CMF. When the available literature is reviewed wholistically it becomes clear that the LAE is state-directed effort to build a massive, dual-use infrastructure network. In peacetime, fleets of eVTOLs and drones deliver packages for Meituan and JD.com. In wartime, this ecosystem transforms into an infinite, decentralized logistics and sensor grid. Just as China subsidized commercial roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ferries with reinforced decks for amphibious lift, they are currently establishing standardized commercial drone corridors to develop the technologies required operationalize the air-ground littoral across China. By mandating military-grade datalinks like BeiDou on commercial platforms, the PLA can ensure it can co-opt the civilian Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) infrastructure during a crisis.
Projected Development of the Aerial Militia (2024 – 2040)
Assuming sustained state funding and linear scaling of current technologies including battery density and AI-driven UTM networks— and without relying on unproven “sci-fi” technological leaps such as the development of general artificial intelligence or profound leaps in propulsion or energy technologies—the LAE’s expansion may follow three distinct phases:
Surviving the Swarm: A Taiwan Scenario
How does the U.S. Joint Force fight in an environment where the sky is black with cheap, autonomous platforms? The current paradigm of shooting down a $5,000 commercial drone with a $3 million Patriot missile will lead directly to operational exhaustion. China has already demonstrated how quickly these systems can be repurposed for crisis response, such as lifting stranded personnel during the Guangxi floods. This demonstrated use of LAE assets to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief underscores how these technologies already extend beyond economic development. The demonstrated HADR capabilities native to the LAE highlights how easily the technologies can apply to wartime casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and resupply.
To counter the likelihood of a militarized LAE, the U.S. and its allies may:
· Shift to Network Defeat: Developing doctrine and investing in capabilities prioritizing non-kinetic (Electronic Warfare/Cyber) defeat of UTM networks and UAV swarm command and control, rather than platform-by-platform kinetic kills will provide the Joint Force with options that meet the operational realities of this possible future. An example of material and organization innovations that could undermine risks imposed by the operationalization of the air-ground littoral might be scalable Directed Energy and High-Power Microwave (HPM) effectors pushed down to the company level.
· Decentralization: The operationalization of the air-ground littoral means that U.S. forces must train in strict emissions control (EMCON), camouflage, and decentralized execution. Leaders must be prepared to fight under ubiquitous overhead surveillance, assuming localized C2 nodes will be jammed or destroyed.
· Hardened Micro-Logistics: Large, static supply depots are highly vulnerable to operationalization of the air-ground littoral due to saturation attacks by UAVs and exposure to precision long-range fires. By transitioning to distributed, hardened, and camouflaged micro-depots protected by persistent c-UAS nets the Joint Force can best protect logistics at the tactical edge.
Dominating the air-ground littoral by establishing a LAE for the Free World
While the U.S. cannot mandate Military-Civil Fusion, integration with private industry can develop options that can support the Department of War during LSCO. Even though the U.S. government cannot force Amazon or Zipline to serve the state, open societies have a distinct advantage: the ability to leverage market incentives, venture capital, and open-system architectures to out-innovate top-down mandates.
To build our own resilient, dual-use LAE, the U.S. can leverage public investment with private innovation:
· Create a Civil Reserve Drone Fleet (CRDF): The DoW, working with Congress and industry could mirror the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to leverage existing organizational structures to integrate commercial drone logistics providers into military supply chains during national emergencies.
· Regulatory Reform: The biggest hurdle to U.S. integration into the LAE for both civil and military purposes is policy. Accelerated FAA approvals for commercial Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations could incentivize investment. Reducing regulatory burdens to make domestic drone delivery economically viable will likely attract the venture capital needed to scale America’s industrial base naturally.
· Subsidize Dual-Use Talent & Tech: Through the Defense Innovation Unit and the Air Force Research Laboratory, the DoW can provide grants that stimulate U.S.-allied development and manufacturing. Creating a “Digital Talent Reserves”—allowing tech industry engineers to serve the Joint Force part-time without abandoning private-sector careers would also facilitate innovation and increase industry understanding of DoW requirements.
The operationalization of the air-ground littoral is happening today. By embracing asymmetric countermeasures and unleashing the engine of Western capitalism, the U.S. and partners can ensure the skies of 2040 remain contested and, ultimately, controlled.
If you enjoyed this post, check out the T2COM G-2’s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight.
About the Author: Mr. Boyer is an experienced intelligence and defense policy professional with 23 years of experience in the field as both a uniformed service member and defense industry partner. He currently works as a threat environment analyst for the United States Army Transformation and Training Command (T2COM). His focus has been the Black Sea and its littoral and has worked directly in the field since 2015 supporting United States European Command, United States Special Operations Command, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Mr. Boyer has published several studies for T2COM, the U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned, and currently supports the T2COM G-2 Wargaming Team.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of War, Department of the Army, or the U.S. Army Transformation and Training Command (T2COM).
