[Editor’s Note: Army Mad Scientist is pleased to feature a passage from the US Army War College strategic research project entitled “Decision Advantage Through Intelligentization by 2035”. In this passage, Lieutenant Colonel Jordan Bathen describes the likelihood of China being able to achieve systems destruction capability in the next decade, and then goes into specifics on the plan to achieve it. He also brilliantly lays out how intelligentization plays into China’s strategy of speed and precision, and the implications it has on U.S. planning in the Indo-Pacific, especially in a scenario where operational coherence is directly under threat.
The members of Team Proxima Horizonte produced this collective strategic research project as a prerequisite for completing the Master of Strategic Studies program at the United States Army War College. The research, analysis, and production of this report were conducted from October 2025 through May 2026. Team Proxima Horizonte is a part of the Army Futures Seminar for Academic Year 2025-2026. The full report can be found here — Read on!]
Introduction
It is likely (55–80%) that by 2035, the PLA will seek to conduct coordinated kinetic system destruction campaigns to collapse adversary operational systems during the initial phase of high-end conflict. Unlike attritional warfare focused on platform destruction, system destruction warfare aims to disable an opponent by destroying key physical nodes, such as command centers, ISR hubs, space enablers, logistics infrastructure, and firepower networks, whose elimination disrupts systemic coherence.
The PLA’s theory of system destruction explicitly integrates precision kinetic strike as a primary instrument for degrading adversary operational capability. Long-range missile forces, air-delivered precision strike, maritime fires, and counterspace capabilities synchronize to produce rapid systemic paralysis consistent with the PLA’s emphasis on coordinated multi-domain strike. This kinetic prioritization reflects the PLA’s broader “liquid” shift toward network disruption through precision strike. If executed effectively, such campaigns could compress adversary decision timelines, degrade command coherence, and generate 100 episodic decision advantage within the first days of conflict. However, because system destruction targets high-value nodes, including strikes against space assets and homeland bases, it also increases the risk of rapid escalation.
Discussion
System destruction warfare is the PLA’s theory of victory in modern conflict. Rather than emphasizing maneuver or platform attrition, the doctrine focuses on paralyzing the enemy’s operational system by degrading or destroying its essential subsystems. Kinetic destruction of key nodes is central to this approach. In PLA doctrine, these include systems for command organization, command information, reconnaissance, intelligence, firepower strike, support, and logistics. Victory is achieved when these systems cannot function cohesively. Kinetic strike plays a decisive role because operational systems depend on physical infrastructure, including data centers, satellites, command facilities, fuel depots, airfields, and munitions storage.
PLA operational planning treats physical node destruction as the primary means of systemic paralysis. Precision missile and airpower salvos sequence to collapse decision, ISR, firepower, and sustainment nodes in rapid succession. This sequencing reflects the logic that systemic coherence depends on physical connectivity. The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) embodies the kinetic foundation of system destruction and operationalizes this sequencing logic through long-range precision strike. China’s embrace of system destruction forms a “liquid” transformation centered on precision
disruption rather than on massing force. Precision long-range strike enables remote destruction of operational nodes, avoidance of early high-casualty maneuver, and immediate systemic shock. Together, these effects allow the PLA to pursue systemic collapse without committing early maneuver forces.
Missile systems such as the DF-21D, DF-26, and emerging hypersonic glide vehicles provide range and precision, capable of striking air operations centers, naval headquarters, logistics hubs, and integrated air defense nodes. Improved ISR, target discrimination, and battle damage assessment allow for rapid iterative strike cycles. The PLA will seek to achieve decisive systemic degradation within the first hours of conflict. This approach mirrors Operation Desert Storm, in which the systemic targeting of Iraqi C2 preceded maneuver operations and informed subsequent PLA doctrine. As operational systems have become increasingly dependent on space-enabled ISR and communications, system destruction logic now extends naturally into the space domain.
Reconnaissance and information transmission systems are core components of operational systems. Physically degrading these nodes fits squarely within system destruction logic. The PLA has demonstrated interest in counterspace kinetic capabilities, notably through its 2007 direct-ascent ASAT test. Kinetic targeting options include direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons, co-orbital interceptors, ground station strikes, and missile strikes on radar and ISR installations. This demonstrated capability suggests that counterspace operations integrate into early-phase system-destruction campaigns. Because modern joint operations rely heavily on space-enabled ISR and communications, kinetic degradation of these nodes could fragment operational awareness. However, kinetic strikes in space generate debris and international escalation risk. Thus, while effectively degrading operational coherence, counterspace system destruction also risks rapid conflict expansion.
System destruction warfare extends beyond immediate decision nodes to sustainment infrastructure. Firepower networks and support systems are essential subsystems within the operational system. Kinetic targeting priorities include fuel storage depots, ammunition stockpiles, port infrastructure, airfield runways, sealift, and airlift nodes. Logistics collapse produces delayed systemic paralysis even if frontline forces remain intact. By integrating long-range missile strikes against logistics hubs, the PLA could degrade operational endurance.
While the focus is kinetic, intelligentization increasingly functions as a force multiplier for system destruction effectiveness. PLA intelligent warfare integrates AI into operational planning and targeting. The PLA is interested in human-machine collaboration to accelerate operational tempo. AI-assisted kill-chain compression allows rapid retargeting of surviving nodes. However, AI systems introduce probabilistic failure risks. In a high-tempo kinetic system destruction campaign, AI misidentification or degraded data inputs could produce unintended escalation. Thus, intelligentization increases the precision and speed of kinetic system destruction while raising uncertainty in escalation management.
Despite doctrinal enthusiasm for intelligentized warfare, the PLA may face operational friction in translating conceptual advances into scalable battlefield performance for kinetic strikes. Open-source Chinese military writings reveal ongoing debate regarding the reliability of AI-enabled systems, the appropriate balance between human and machine control, and the risks of algorithmic opacity and system vulnerability. These tensions suggest that while AI integration is central to the PLA’s modernization trajectory, institutional uncertainty and technical limitations could complicate efforts to achieve seamless human–machine fusion at scale. As a result, although intelligentized kinetic strike capabilities are likely to enhance aspects of decision speed and information processing, they may not fully remove vulnerabilities within the PLA’s broader operational system.
Implications
High-end conflict in the Indo-Pacific will open with coordinated kinetic salvos targeting systemic nodes rather than force concentrations. These dynamics suggest U.S. planning may need to account for distributed C2, hardened infrastructure, rapid node reconstitution, deception, and redundancy. If PLA exercises demonstrate coordinated multi-domain strike sequencing against simulated node targets within hours of conflict initiation, that would
confirm system destruction sequencing has transitioned from doctrine to operational rehearsal. This opening dynamic would compress warning timelines and challenge traditional escalation management models.
Kinetic system destruction campaigns inherently target high-value infrastructure, including homeland bases and space assets. If China deploys co-orbital satellite inspection vehicles in proximity to adversary ISR assets, that could indicate counterspace kinetic options are being pre-positioned. Such targeting would compress escalation timelines and reduce opportunities for political signaling. System destruction warfare privileges speed over gradual coercion. Victory in high-end conflict depends less on cumulative platform losses and more on which force can collapse the other’s operational system first.
If you enjoyed this post, check out the T2COM G-2’s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight.
About the Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jordan Bathen is a U.S. Marine Corps supply officer and a recent graduate of the U.S. Army War College, Class of 2026. While attending the War College, he was a member of the Futures Seminar special program, where his team researched the People’s Republic of China’s shift to intelligentization and the indicators demonstrating the achievement of decision advantage. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Financial Management from the University of Northern Iowa, as well as a Master of Operational Studies and a Master of Strategic Studies from Army University. He currently serves as the Deputy Branch Head for Reserve Affairs Careers with the Marine Corps’ Reserve Affairs Division.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, or the Transformation and Training Command (T2COM)
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