[Editor’s Note: Army Mad Scientist welcomes today’s guest blogger LTC Matthew J. Fecteau with his submission exploring why North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members should prepare for Q-Day — the maturation of quantum technologies — given its potential impact on warfighting and the operational environment.
Quantum technologies are poised to fundamentally change the character of warfare — altering the speed, security, and visibility of operations. Advances in quantum sensing could eliminate the strategic advantage of stealth for systems like submarines and aircraft, making it nearly impossible to hide critical assets on an already transparent battlefield. Simultaneously, quantum computing‘s massive processing power will compress the time from detection to engagement, enabling algorithmic warfare where complex decision-making, planning, and targeting occur in seconds or minutes, far outpacing human-centric response capabilities. This acceleration of the kill chain and the erosion of stealth may force militaries to completely rethink their traditional doctrines of maneuver, protection, and deterrence.
This quantum technological shift may also create a critical security and intelligence dilemma centered on decision dominance and information advantage. Quantum computing will eventually render current public-key encryption obsolete, exposing vast amounts of sensitive military and government data—a looming threat known as “harvest-now, decrypt-later.” Conversely, quantum communication technologies like Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) promise theoretically unbreakable, secure channels, leading to a high-stakes “race to secure and deceive.” The nation (or Alliance) that first masters both the offensive decryption capabilities of quantum computing and the defensive communication shield of quantum cryptography will gain a potentially decisive, albeit fleeting, advantage in intelligence and battlefield deception. This places information security and control at the absolute forefront of military competition.
LTC Fecteau examines why preparing for Q-Day is especially critical for NATO, with a bellicose Russian Federation looming on its eastern flank. Russia’s own pursuit of quantum technology breakthroughs could enhance its asymmetric warfare capabilities — granting it quantum-enhanced information advantage and deception capabilities. LTC Fecteau provides us with a five-step prescription for ensuring a “quantum ready” Alliance — read on to learn why the convergence of quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, and machine learning will transform the future of large-scale multidomain operations!]
Introduction
The clock is ticking for the NATO Alliance (“the Alliance”) with the convergence of quantum technology with contemporary capabilities that could unleash a potentially seismic shift across the operational environment. The pivotal point, which can be called Q-Day, marks the maturation of quantum capabilities to a level of significant strategic impact. This moment could either materialize as a sudden, revolutionary upheaval or through a more gradual, evolutionary change. The Allies, therefore, should explore the emerging and disruptive field of quantum technologies to ensure its strategic concept or core purpose and its capabilities remain relevant and effective.
Quantum Technologies: Hype, Reality, and the Need for Caution
Some may justifiably question investment in nascent technologies still in the early stages of development. While quantum systems have demonstrated prowess in specific, controlled scenarios, they have yet to outperform classical digital 
computers across all realms. Furthermore, the fundamental element of quantum computers, qubits, have extreme sensitivity to environmental disturbances. These disturbances or “noise” have an inherent ability to exist in multiple states at the same time – known as superposition, which leads to decoherence and contributes to higher error rates. Thus, any criticism is somewhat valid, as quantum technologies may be somewhat overhyped.
That said, quantum technologies will be impactful — we cannot afford to overlook the influence of these capabilities on the operational environment. Today, the accessibility of quantum technical power is no longer confined to overpriced, highly controlled research labs outside the reach of the public — platforms like IBM’s quantum computer terminal are readily available through open-source tools like Qiskit and are proof positive these capabilities exist. Moreover, Google claimed to have achieved quantum supremacy in 2019 (albeit generating some skepticism). Thus, these capabilities are not theoretical constructs but existing, though developmental, realities — accessible for experimentation.
The Fundamental Shift: Quantum Computing Versus Classical Systems
Gaining a deep appreciation for how the next generation of quantum-based tools might transform operational contexts requires stepping back from conventional computing frameworks. Quantum systems operate on principles that differ so significantly from established digital or classical models that they may represent an entirely new class of capability. Traditional digital computers rely on transistors to represent information as binary bits – either a zero or a one. Digital computing has seen significant progress, especially with Nvidia’s GPUs and TPUs, which enable parallel processing that drives advancements in artificial intelligence and machine learning. Thus, at this moment, digital computers remain critical to any combat environment.
In contrast, quantum technology uses qubits, which can exist in a superposition — representing both 0 and 1 simultaneously — opening possibilities far beyond classical binary systems. Adding another layer of quantum power, entanglement allows two or more qubits to become linked in a shared quantum state, irrespective of physical distance, enabling extraordinarily powerful computations by manipulating these interconnected qubits simultaneously.
Quantum Technologies and Moscow’s Asymmetric Playbook
Regardless of the Alliance’s investment in quantum technologies today, Moscow views these technologies as game changing and it is actively engaging in intelligence gathering and information acquisition. The Kremlin is 
alleged to be at the forefront of quantum research. Despite economic pressure from sanctions to include AI chips, Moscow claims it has met significant milestones, including the development of advanced quantum computers and various prototypes, with continued innovation targeted through 2030. Furthermore, Moscow’s historic broader strategic framework has embraced information operations through the doctrine of Maskirovka — emphasizing deception and concealment — for which quantum-enhanced technology could aid in disinformation campaigns through the creation of deepfakes.
Moscow is known for its embrace of asymmetric capabilities and could theoretically leverage quantum algorithms (e.g., Shor’s algorithm), to break currently employed public-key encryption algorithms. This potential has led to the adoption of a “harvest now, decrypt later” strategy, where encrypted information is being collected with the anticipation of future decryption for use against competitors and adversaries. A tangible example of this forward-leaning approach occurred in 2022 when Moscow rerouted internet traffic from disputed territory in Ukraine to its own servers. While much of this traffic remains inaccessible due to current cryptographic methods, the advent of robust quantum technologies may change this dynamic.
The implications for the Allies’ defense and deterrence posture are far-reaching and constantly evolving. When digital or supercomputers tackle problems with multiple variables, they must calculate each variable change sequentially. Even with advancement in artificial intelligence and machine learning, the Alliance currently lacks the predictive capabilities to explore various courses of action within the operational environment.
Conversely, quantum simulations open the interesting possibility of delving into a wide spectrum of what is known as superposition. In the future, quantum simulations could encompass complex combat scenarios via 
sophisticated war gaming or the development of dynamic conceptual operating pictures, theoretically recommending the optimal course of action for the Alliance in response to aggression or during potential confrontations. The Kremlin could develop significant comparative quantum capabilities ahead of the Alliance. However, current quantum technologies are still in the early stages of development and face limitations in the number and stability of qubits required for such intricate simulations.
Russian strategy often hinges on identifying and leveraging weaknesses that more powerful opponents may overlook. This is carried out by creatively using unconventional tools or tactics — relying on surprise, misdirection, secrecy, and advances in technology. The intent is to interfere with how competitors make decisions and weaken their resolve, allowing Moscow to secure its goals with limited direct military engagement.
In contrast to the Allies, the Kremlin’s broad spectrum of asymmetric tools is designed to offset conventional superiority or greater technical sophistication on the part of an adversary by targeting vulnerabilities that quantum technology is poised to exacerbate. This array already includes sophisticated information and influence operations, cyberwarfare capabilities, advanced data analytics such as artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms, electronic warfare systems, unmanned systems, autonomous platforms, and counter-space capabilities.
Recommendations for Quantum Readiness
In 2024, with the strategic concept as its bedrock, the Alliance published its foundational quantum strategy to embrace a “quantum ready” future. This adoption of quantum technologies already exists within the private sector, which has become a subject of intense strategic competition. The Alliance outlines how quantum technology can be integrated into critical defense and security domains through advanced sensing, high-resolution imaging, precise positioning, navigation and timing, improved submarine detection capabilities, and the enhancement and protection of data transmission systems through the development and implementation of quantum-resistant cryptography.
Even so, there remains room for the Allies to reform their approach. One avenue involves backing initiatives that serve both civilian and defense purposes. While the Alliance’s current strategy embraces a “learn-by-doing” approach, the establishment of operational prototypes and dedicated sandbox environments for rigorous testing of quantum communications and quantum-enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities would significantly accelerate both the integration of these technologies and the development of effective operational doctrine.
Second, the Allies ought to take the initiative to mold an international approach to quantum technology, which includes setting up explicit guidelines to discourage potential attacks leveraging quantum capabilities. Although the Alliance recognizes some challenges, it is presently postponing the detailed formulation of policies for future strategic contexts.
Third, to address personnel shortfalls, the Alliance could launch a dedicated strategic partnership through the development of fellowships with leading academic institutions to cultivate the next generation of quantum defense and offense personnel. While the Alliance recognizes the existing talent gap, a direct and substantial investment in dedicated training programs — akin to the Fulbright or Erasmus programs, but tailored explicitly for quantum technologies relevant to defense — would be instrumental in securing a long-term workforce to undermine Moscow’s efforts.
Fourth, ensuring a secure, yet enduring quantum supply chain framework is paramount. This framework should evaluate robust export controls with the creation of backup production capacity. While the Allies’ quantum strategy makes fleeting mention of supply chain considerations, regional or international competitors could exploit dependencies in areas like cryogenics or rare-earth elements to gain strategic leverage. The Alliance must proactively mitigate these vulnerabilities before adversarial influence can solidify.
Finally, the Allies can create selected units to apply a convergent approach as they transition into practical, sustainable artificial intelligence and machine 
learning toward a “quantum ready” Alliance. This convergence approach of both quantum technologies and other capabilities is essential to large-scale multidomain operations. The merging of ideas, techniques and approaches combined with human oversight can lead to high-impact deliverables or outputs.
Conclusion
Until Q-Day dawns, the geopolitical landscape between Moscow and the Allies will remain in a state of unease. Quantum technologies demand continued rigorous exploration and sustained development efforts to ensure that the Alliance can deter and defend against recognized competitors within the region. While the 
theoretical possibilities offered by quantum mechanics are expansive, the applied realization of vigorous, fault-tolerant quantum platforms is still a journey in progress the Alliance must take. Ultimately, whichever side achieves a decisive quantum advantage first could hold the key to unlocking and exploiting vulnerabilities across the globe.
If you enjoyed this post, check out the T2COM G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including:
Our T2COM OE Threat Assessment 1.0, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations
Our China Landing Zone, full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, T2COM OE Threat Assessment 1-1, How China Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations, 10 Things You Didn’t Know About the PLA, and BiteSize China weekly topics.
Our Russia Landing Zone, including T2COM OE Threat Assessment 1-2, How Russia Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations and the BiteSize Russia weekly topics. If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine in 2022 and 2023 and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P.
Our Iran Landing Zone, including the Iran Quick Reference Guide and the Iran Passive Defense Manual (both require a CAC to access).
Our North Korea Landing Zone, including Resources for Studying North Korea, Instruments of Chinese Military Influence in North Korea, and Instruments of Russian Military Influence in North Korea.
Our Irregular Threats Landing Zone, including TC 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces, and ATP 3-37.2, Antiterrorism (requires a CAC to access).
Our Running Estimates SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access) — documenting what we’re learning about the evolving OE (including Russia’s war in Ukraine war since 2024 and other ongoing competitions and conflicts around the globe). Contains our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the quarterly OE Assessment Intelligence Posts.
Then review the following related Mad Scientist Laboratory content…
Project Deterrence – Disruptive Technologies
China and Russia: Achieving Decision Dominance and Information Advantage, by Ian Sullivan
China’s Emerging Technologies Highly Likely to Undermine U.S. & Allied Advantage by 2035, by proclaimed Mad Scientist COL Byron N. Cadiz
Quantum Surprise on the Battlefield? by proclaimed Mad Scientist Elsa Kania
Quantum Conundrum: Multi-domain Threats, Convergent Technology & Hybrid Strategy, by Robert McCreight
A Strategy for Everything: Quantum Artificial Intelligence, Quantum Multiverse, and Feedback Loop of Finite Information, by Victor R. Morris
About the Author: Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Fecteau is a PhD researcher at King’s College London and an information operations officer assigned to NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). He can be reached at matthew.fecteau.alumni@armywarcollege.edu.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, the Transformation and Training Command (T2COM), or NATO.
